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A commentary on
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[Epub ahead of print].
The dual-process theory of recognition memory posits that recognition is supported by
two separable processes: familiarity and recollection. Familiarity is the feeling of previously
encountering something, without retrieval of contextual information about that encounter, whereas
recollection refers to additional retrieval of contextual details (Yonelinas, 2002). While it is
generally agreed that recognition of a single item can be supported by both processes, memory for
novel associations between items is usually thought to require recollection (e.g., Yonelinas, 1997;
Donaldson and Rugg, 1998; Hockley and Consoli, 1999). Nonetheless, one situation when memory
for an association between items might be supported by familiarity is when the items are bound
together as a single unit; so-called “unitization” (e.g., Yonelinas et al., 1999; Rhodes and Donaldson,
2008; Jäger and Mecklinger, 2009; Diana et al., 2011; Tibon et al., 2014a,b).
Shao et al. (2015) recently reported interesting differences between two tasks that have been
used to investigate the effects of unitization on associative recognition. In the first, compound task
(Experiments 1 and 2), participants’ memory for initially-unrelated stimuli was tested after two
types of encoding. In the definition condition, the words were given a definition that enabled a new,
unitized concept. This condition was compared against the sentence condition, where the words
were presented as separate components of a sentence. In the second, imagery task (Experiment 3),
the same types of words were used, but unitization was tested by comparing interactive-imagery
condition (“create an image of the items interacting together”) with an item-imagery condition
(“create a separate image for each item”).
Shao et al.’s driving hypothesis was that the imagery task engages more recollection than the
compound task, due to the flexibility afforded by adopting self-generated, elaborative encoding
strategies. They further suggested that this increased recollection reduces the contribution of
familiarity to the associative recognition task. They tested this hypothesis by combining both types
of task with the Remember/Know procedure. In Experiment 1, they replicated the unitization
advantage in the compound task. In Experiment 2 they found that this advantage was associated
with increased familiarity. However, when using the imagery task in Experiment 3, they found that
interactive imagery, which was supposed to encourage unitization, produced increased recollection
and reduced familiarity. The authors claimed that this supports their hypothesis that when the
memory trace is easily recollected (e.g., following interactive-imagery), the need for familiarity
assessment is redundant, and so the effect of unitization on familiarity disappears. Although
intriguing, we would like to offer alternative perspectives on both methodological and theoretical
aspects of their report, which lead to the opposite conclusion.
Our methodological concern relates to the procedure used in the imagery task. The finding
of reduced familiarity in the interactive condition is inconsistent with a previous study by
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FIGURE 1 | Formulization of plausible models according to the
dual-process account (e.g., Yonelinas, 2002), Shao et al. (2015)’s
account, and our account. The simple form of each model (top row)
represents a case in which a variable (E, e.g., unitization) affects one
recognition process (either familiarity, F, or recollection, R), which in turn
affects the other. In the generic form (bottom row), E affects both
recognition processes. Using this depiction, one can see why a change in
familiarity but no change in recollection would be problematic for Shao’s
model (which assumes the route to diminished F is via increased R).
Similarly, a change in recollection but no change in familiarity would be
problematic for our model (which assumes the route to diminished R is
via increased F).
Rhodes and Donaldson (2008). One difference between the
two studies is that, in the item-imagery condition, Shao et al.
instructed participants to indicate which one of the two mental
images was clearer. These instructions would seem to encourage
some interaction between images, which would in turn foster
unitization. Thus it is possible that unitization occurred in
both of Shao et al.’s encoding conditions (the authors do
acknowledge this, but for a different reason). If so, the reason
why familiarity estimates were higher in the item-imagery than
interactive-imagery condition would be because Shao et al. used a
shorter study, and repeated each item twice, in the item-imagery
condition. Though this was supposed to match overall memory
performance across the two conditions, a possible consequence
is that familiarity was actually stronger in the item-imagery
condition.
This leads us to our theoretical concern, regarding interactions
between recollection and familiarity. The dominant view of
recollection and familiarity is that they are independent
(Yonelinas, 2002). Nonetheless, Shao et al. claim that the two
processes can sometimes interact; specifically, that increasing
recollection can decrease familiarity. However, it is equally
possible that when familiarity is readily available, participants
do not need to engage in effortful recollection. This opposite
type of interaction is in line with other theoretical characteristics
of recollection and familiarity. In particular, familiarity is often
claimed to be automatic, and occurs faster than recollection
(Yonelinas, 2002; Diana et al., 2006; though see Moscovitch,
2008). Indeed, ERP studies reveal ample evidence of earlier
onset of the putative “FN400” correlate of familiarity than the
“LPC” correlate of recollection (e.g., Mecklinger, 2000; Rugg and
Curran, 2007; Wilding and Ranganath, 2011). But perhaps the
most compelling evidence for our proposal comes from the ERP
study of Bader et al. (2010). These authors used the compound
task, and found the FN400 effect for unitized word-pairs, whereas
the LPC was only elicited by non-unitized word-pairs. Given that
the familiarity-related modulation occurred earlier, these authors
claimed, like us, that familiarity can sometimes be sufficiently
diagnostic to support associative recognition, obviating the need
for additional recollection.
These considerations have wider implications, because
evidence that recollection and familiarity interact would
question the common assumption that these processes operate
independently. Note that recollection and familiarity can show
parallel or even opposing effects of another variable without
interacting, so conclusive evidence for such interaction is
difficult to obtain. Nonetheless, if we assume, like Shao et al
suggest, that changes in recollection can sometimes cause
changes in familiarity, one should not find an experimental
variable (like unitization) that affects familiarity without also
affecting recollection (though it is possible for recollection
to change without familiarity changing). According to our
alternative, however, one should not find a variable that affects
recollection without also affecting familiarity (though it is
possible for familiarity to change without recollection changing).
There is some evidence against both of these possibilities
(Figure 1). Again, both of these patterns can be explained
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if recollection and familiarity are independent. Therefore, we
believe the consideration of data like Shao et al’s raises important
questions about whether, and if so when and how, familiarity
and recollection interact to determine people’s recognition
judgments.
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